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The Effect of Market Size Structure on Competition: 
The Case of Small Business Lending 
 
I.  Introduction 
The consolidation of the banking industry is having a substantial impact on both the 
structure of the industry and the organization of the institutions that comprise it.  As a result of the 
worldwide wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), both the number of small banks and the 
proportion of assets controlled by them are decreasing.  There is concern that the changing nature 
of banks and banking markets might result in reduced credit availability or higher interest rates for 
some small business borrowers.  Small businesses are often informationally opaque and have few 
external financing alternatives other than relationship loans from commercial banks. 
We contribute to this discussion by examining the small business lending market in a new 
way.  We focus on an aspect of competition that has been substantially overlooked in the literature 
on market structure.  Specifically, we examine how the size structure of a banking market affects 
the way that participants compete to serve small business borrowers.  Banking market size 
structure, as we define it here, refers to the distribution of market shares of different size classes of 
banks in a local market, whether or not that size is achieved entirely in that local market.  This 
allows us to account for the possibility that large regional or nationwide banking organizations 
may compete in different ways than small, local institutions. 
To illustrate the importance of changes in banking market size structure, we note as banks 
have become larger, local market concentration has increased only slightly.  From 1984 – 1998, 
the average size of a U.S. bank more than tripled from $174 million to $584 million and the 
median size more than doubled from $34 million to $69 million.  However, the average local 
market Herfindahl index, which is typically used in research and antitrust analysis to summarize 
the state of competition, increased by less than 3% from 0.225 to 0.231 over the same time 
interval.  This finding suggests that the conventional measure of market structure may be missing 
an important component of banking consolidation – the changes in bank size and market size 
structure that result from bank M&As between institutions in different local markets.  These 
market-extension M&As do not significantly change local market concentration, but they do shift   2
the ownership of the local banking resources into the hands of larger banking organizations.  This 
raises the possibility that some small businesses may be affected by changes in the size of their 
bank or the size structure of their local market.  We ask whether it matters if M&As replace small 
banks with large banks, even if there is no change in local market concentration. 
We begin our analysis with the important question of how market size structure affects 
whether small businesses have their lines of credit (LCs) at small banks or at large banks.   
Previous studies concluded that small businesses are disproportionately less likely to borrow from 
larger banks.  The approach often used in this literature was to examine the ratios of small 
business loans to assets for banks of different sizes.  These findings showed that large banks 
generally have much lower proportions of small business loans than small banks, suggesting that 
large banks have difficulty extending at least some types of credit to small businesses. 
Our results are not consistent with the conclusions of the previous literature, and we 
suggest some reasons why this prior research might be misleading.  We look at this issue from the 
perspective of the small business, rather than from the bank’s perspective.  Our approach is to 
examine how changing the size structure of a market affects the probability that a small business 
has an LC from a bank of a particular size class.  We find that the likelihood of having an LC 
from a bank in a given size class generally is not declining with bank size. 
Some exceptions to these general findings do occur, in part due to data limitations.  The 
very smallest loans (LCs < $100,000) and the very smallest banks (assets < $100 million) appear 
to be different.  For the very smallest loans, the probability of having the LC at a bank of a given 
size class appears to decrease with bank size for the smallest two bank size classes (assets under 
$1 billion), but we do not have reliable estimates for the probability of having an LC at banks in 
the largest two size classes (assets over $1 billion).  It is also difficult to obtain reliable estimates 
for the probabilities that the very smallest banks extend larger LCs (LCs ≥  $100,000), since so 
few of these banks meet the legal lending requirements to compete for these loans. 
We also examine the effects of bank size structure, market concentration, and other 
variables on the pricing of LCs.  One of the new results in this paper is that the size structure of   3
the banking market appears to matter in pricing even when controlling for the size of the lending 
bank, market concentration, length of the bank-borrower relationship, and other bank, firm, and 
market characteristics found to affect small business loan prices in the extant literature.  We find 
that loan rates to small business borrowers are lower in markets dominated by large banks. 
The importance of market size structure may indicate that banks compete differently in 
markets dominated by small banks than in markets dominated by large banks.  It may be the case 
that the banks in markets dominated by small banks compete less aggressively and exercise more 
market power in pricing.  When large banks enter small-bank dominated markets, they may 
charge high interest rates consistent with those charged by small banks in these markets rather 
than compete aggressively for market share.  However, as the presence of large banks grows to a 
critical mass, competition may intensify and prices may decline.  Consistent with this hypothesis, 
we find that size structure is only statistically significant in the markets with relatively high small-
bank presence.  Further evidence supporting this hypothesis is obtained when we divide our 
sample into large and small banks.  We find that size structure affects the prices of large banks but 
not small banks.  That is, the interest rates small banks charge do not depend in an important way 
on the market they are located, but large banks charge higher interest rates in markets with high 
proportions of small banks than they do in markets dominated by large banks. 
By analyzing the impact of bank size structure, we are able to contribute to two different 
strands of the literature on small business credit.  First, our analysis of the effects of banking 
market size structure on the size of bank from which small businesses obtain LCs suggests that 
some prior studies of small business credit availability may be misleading.  These studies often 
concluded that large banks or recently consolidated banks are less inclined to make small business 
loans because they allocate a lower proportion of their assets to small business lending.  We 
discuss below how this approach in the literature ignores the possibility that a large bank or 
recently consolidated bank may have a low small-business-loan-to-asset ratio because the 
denominator of the ratio is expanded, rather than because the numerator is contracted.  In addition, 
this prior approach ignores the distribution of potential small business loan customers.  Our new   4
approach avoids these problems by looking at lending from the perspective of the borrower and by 
examining the size structure of the market. 
Second, our approach is more comprehensive than prior studies of loan pricing.  There is 
little prior research on the effects of bank size or market size structure on loan prices.  Earlier 
studies generally focused on the effects of market concentration, M&As, and bank-borrower 
relationships on pricing, which are related to bank size and size structure.  Our approach analyzes 
the effects of bank size, banking market size structure, market concentration, bank-borrower 
relationships, and other factors in determining LC interest rates in a single comprehensive way 
that also accounts for other bank, market, and firm, and loan contract characteristics. 
This paper is also more comprehensive than most prior studies in both the small business 
credit availability and pricing literatures in that we use both bank data and firm data.  Most of 
these prior studies used either bank data or firm data, but not both.  Studies of the effects of bank 
size, market concentration, and M&As often used bank data, but did not have information on 
individual small businesses to which these banks lend.  Such studies were unable to account for 
firm risk, opacity, and other characteristics important to credit and pricing decisions.  The 
exclusion of firm-specific information may have resulted in biases if, for example, large banks 
tend to lend to less risky firms.  Conversely, studies of the effects of banking relationships on loan 
prices have often employed information on small businesses, but were unable to match the firms 
with their banks and local markets.  These studies were unable to account for bank size, bank 
market size structure, market concentration, and other bank and market characteristics that may be 
important to the effects of banking relationships and the treatment of small businesses.  These 
exclusions may have created biases if, for example, the strength of relationship is correlated with 
bank size or bank size structure.  Of the few relevant studies that did match small business data 
with bank data, none evaluated and compared the effects of both individual bank size and banking 
market size structure, and none analyzed the size of the lending bank and the interest rates on 
loans in a single comprehensive data set.   5
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the literature on small 
business loan pricing and the literature on the effects of bank size and M&As on lending to small 
businesses.  In Section III, we describe our data and methodology.  Section IV gives our empirical 
results, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Related literature 
Our paper is related to the two strands of the banking literature.  The first strand examines 
the effects of bank size on the quantity of lending available to small businesses.  The second 
examines some of the determinants of the pricing of small business bank loans.   
Before examining these two strands of literature, it may be helpful to review the main 
argument why bank size may affect small business lending.  The argument focuses on the 
disadvantages that large banks may have in relationship lending to informationally opaque small 
businesses.  Under relationship lending, banks accumulate information over time beyond the 
relatively transparent data available in the financial statements and other sources readily available 
at the time of origination.  The information is gathered through contact over time with the firm, its 
owner, its suppliers, its customers, and its local community on a variety of dimensions.  This is 
distinguished from transactions lending, under which due diligence and contract terms are based 
on information that is relatively easily available at the time of origination.  Large banks are 
hypothesized to have difficulty extending relationship loans to informationally opaque small 
businesses because of Williamson-type organizational diseconomies of providing relationship 
lending services along with providing transactions lending services and other services to their 
large corporate customers (Williamson 1967, 1988).  Large banks may also be disadvantaged 
because relationship lending often requires “soft” information that may be difficult to transmit 
through the communication channels of large organizations (Stein 2002).
1 
                                                           
1  Large banks may also face difficulties in extending relationship loans because these banks are on average 
headquartered at longer distances from potential small business borrowers.  One theoretical study found that 
relationship lending diminishes with “informational distance,” or the costs of generating borrower-specific 
information, which is likely to be associated with physical distance (Hauswald and Marquez 2000).   6
In the context of this argument, one literature examines whether large banks are less 
inclined to make small business loans. A number of studies found that large banks allocate a far 
lower proportion of their assets to small business loans than do small banks (e.g., Berger, 
Kashyap, and Scalise 1995).  Representative of these studies, the small business loans-to-asset 
ratio (where small business loans are credits under $1 million) as of June 1995 declines from 
8.85% to 7.71% to 4.18% to 1.95% as bank size increases from the $0-100 million range in gross 
total assets to the $100 million-$1 billion range to the $1-10 billion range to the above $10 billion 
range.  Consistent with this, a number of studies found that the ratio of small business loans to 
assets declines after large banks are involved in M&As (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1998, Strahan 
and Weston 1998, Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998).  However, some recent research 
suggests that these effects of M&As may be offset to a significant degree by “external effects” in 
the local market in which the supply of small business lending increases from incumbent banks 
(e.g., Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 1998, Avery and Samolyk 2000, Berger, Goldberg, and 
White 2001) or newly chartered banks (e.g., Seelig and Critchfield 1999, Berger, Bonime, 
Goldberg, White 2000).
  
We take issue, however, with the methodology typically used in analyzing the association 
between bank size or M&As and small business lending propensities.  These studies often drew 
the conclusion that large banks were less inclined to make small business loans than small banks 
from the observation that large banks have lower proportions of their assets invested in these 
loans. 
A potential problem with this approach is that it explicitly or implicitly takes banks’ 
assets to be fixed, and does not allow for the possibility that large banks or recently consolidated 
banks expand their assets to take advantage of their greater opportunities to make large business 
loans.  Because of legal lending limits and problems of diversification, small banks have fewer 
opportunities to make large business loans than do large banks.  It is possible that large banks or 
banks engaged in M&As make small business loans in proportion or more than in proportion to 
their local market presence, but simply have lower ratios of small business loans to total assets 
because these banks expand their assets to make more large business loans.  That is, large banks   7
or banks involved in M&As may have low ratios of small business loans to assets because the 
denominator of the ratio is expanded, rather than because the numerator is contracted. 
The approach in the literature also explicitly or implicitly ignores the distribution of 
potential small business loan customers in the markets in which the banks are present.  For 
example, it maybe the case that many large banks make fewer small business loans relative to 
their assets because there are proportionately fewer positive-net-present-value small business loan 
opportunities in the markets in which they compete. 
These studies typically did not have access to information on the pool of small businesses 
to which the banks in their studies did lend, and so were unable to account for firm risk, opacity, 
and other characteristics that may be important to credit decisions.  The exclusion of firm-specific 
information may have resulted in biases if large and small banks tend to lend to different firms.  
Other research that did have access to both bank and firm information suggested that large banks 
tend to skew the small business loans they do make away from relationship borrowers.
2  
The approach taken in this paper avoids these potential problems by looking at lending 
from the perspective of the small business, rather than from that of the bank.  We ask whether the 
chances of obtaining a loan from a large bank versus a small bank is roughly in proportion to the 
market presence of large versus small banks.  Our approach embodies no assumption of bank 
assets being fixed and we account for the presence of banks of different sizes in the firm’s local 
market.  We also include firm characteristics to control for the possibility that large and small 
banks tend to lend to different types of small business borrowers.
3 
                                                           
2 Relative to small banks, large banks have been found to 1) lend to larger, older, more financially secure 
small businesses (Haynes, Ou, and Berney 1999); 2) base their approval/denial decisions more on financial 
ratios, rather than prior relationships (Cole, Goldberg, and White 1999); 3) charge relatively low interest 
rates and have low collateral requirements for small businesses, which may reflect that these tend to be 
relatively safe transactions credits rather than relatively risky relationship credits (Berger and Udell 1996); 
and 4) lend to firms that borrow from multiple banks, which are more likely to be transactions loans, rather 
than relationship loans which are more often made under exclusive lending arrangements (Berger, Klapper, 
and Udell 2001).  Thus, the evidence suggests that large banks are more likely to make transactions loans, 
whereas small banks are more likely to make relationship loans. 
3 Another potential problem with studies that rely only on bank data is that small business lending is 
typically defined in terms of the size of the loan or LC, rather than the size of the business.  Our study, in 
contrast, focuses only on small businesses as defined by Small Business Administration guidelines.   8
As noted above, consolidation has not only changed average bank size, it has also 
changed the size structure of local banking markets.  Only one study, however, has considered the 
impact of the local banking market size structure on small business lending.  It found that the 
probability of having an LC and dependence on trade credit were not related to the presence of 
small banks in the market (Jayaratne and Wolken 1999).  However, that study did not account for 
the size of the individual banks making the loans and did not address the issue of whether banks 
of a given size tend to lend to small businesses in proportion to their market presence.  In our 
analysis, we specifically address this issue in a model of the probability of having a line of credit 
from a bank of a given size class based on the presence of that size class in the market and other 
factors.
4 
The second strand of related literature focuses on the determinants of the prices of small 
business loans and other retail banking products.  Very little of this literature directly examines 
the effects of bank size.  But there are many studies of the effects on pricing of bank 
concentration, M&As, and bank-borrower relationships, which are related to issues of bank size 
and size structure.
5   
Studies of the effect of banking market concentration generally found that banks in more 
concentrated markets charge higher rates on small business loans and pay lower rates on retail 
deposits (e.g., Berger and Hannan 1989, 1997, Hannan 1991).  Studies also found that the deposit 
rates of banks in concentrated markets responded slowly to changes in open-market interest rates 
(i.e., were “sticky”), consistent with the exercise of market power (e.g., Hannan and Berger 1991, 
Neumark and Sharpe 1992).  M&As that involved very substantial increases in local market 
concentration were also found to raise market power in setting prices, although the effects of 
modest increases in concentration were ambiguous (e.g., Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey 1997, 
                                                           
4 One study examined the effect of size structure at the state level (rather than at the local market level) on 
total loan supply in the state (not just to small businesses).  It found that loan supplies in states with high 
proportions of small banks depend pro-cyclically on banks’ internal generation of capital more than in states 
with low proportions of small banks (Ostergaard 2001). 
5 One study that did examine the effects of bank size on small business loan prices found that large banks 
tend to charge relatively low interest rates  (Berger and Udell 1996).  However, since this study did not have 
data on the small businesses, the finding may have reflected differences in the type of small business and 
type of loan (e.g., safe transactions credits rather than risky relationship credits), as opposed to differences 
in prices of a given type of loan to a given type of small business.     9
Simons and Stavins 1998, Prager and Hannan 1999).  On balance, this research suggests that 
higher local market concentration driven by consolidation leads to an increase in market power in 
retail banking.  However, these studies of the effects of market concentration and M&As 
generally used bank data, but did not have information on individual small businesses and other 
retail customers, and so were unable to account for risk, opacity, and other characteristics that 
affect prices.
6 
The impact of banking relationships on small business loan pricing has also been studied.  
The empirical evidence generally suggests that stronger relationships (with strength measured in 
various ways) are empirically associated with lower loan interest rates (e.g., Berger and Udell 
1995, Harhoff and Körting 1998, Degryse and van Cayseele 2000) and greater smoothing of loan 
interest rates over the interest rate cycle (e.g., Berlin and Mester 1998, Ferri and Messori 2000).
7  
These studies of the effects of banking relationships on loan prices generally incorporated 
information on small businesses, but were often unable to match the firms with their banks and 
local markets.  As a result, these studies were often unable to account for bank size, bank market 
size structure, market concentration and other bank and market characteristics that may be 
important to the effects of banking relationships and the treatment of small businesses.  These 
exclusions may have created biases if, for example, the strength of the relationship is correlated 
with bank size or size structure. 
Our analysis of small business loan prices charged by banks is much more comprehensive 
than those in this strand of the literature and avoids some of the biases.  We include bank size and 
banking market structure, which have been excluded from almost all pricing studies.  We also 
include variables measuring market concentration and M&As, but unlike most prior studies of 
these factors, we control for firm characteristics.  As well, we include a measure of the strength of 
                                                           
6 It is also possible that contact between banking organizations in multiple local markets may affect pricing 
and other aspects of competition.   The evidence on this issue is mixed and generally suggests little effect of 
multimarket contact except when there is a substantial amount of contact (e.g., Pilloff 1999). 
7 Not all of this research found that credit terms improve with the strength of the relationship.  For example, 
some found either unclear or negative associations between the length of the relationship and loan rates 
(Petersen and Rajan 1994, Blackwell and Winters 1997, Angelini, Salvo, and Ferri 1998).   10
the bank-borrower relationship, but unlike most prior studies of the effects of relationship 
strength, we also include measures of bank and banking market characteristics. 
 
III. Data and methodology 
Our data source for small businesses is the National Survey of Small Business Finance 
(NSSBF), which queried businesses about their status as of 1993.  It has information on 4,630 
small businesses, defined as companies with fewer than the 500 full-time equivalent employees.  
This data set contains information about the firm, its financial condition, its organizational 
structure, its financial contracts, and the banks from which it purchases its financial services. 
We confine attention to the firms whose most recent bank loan was an LC.  We focus on 
the most recent loan because this is the only loan on which the NSSBF collects detailed 
information on pricing and other contract terms.  We use LCs because they are the most closely 
associated with relationship lending, are generally the best indicators of credit availability, and are 
reasonably comparable across firms.  Other types of loans, such as mortgages, motor vehicle 
loans, and equipment loans, are often based primarily on the value of the collateral, rather than 
any information gained over the course of a relationship.  It has been shown that LCs are also 
much more often an exclusive lending relationship than these other types of loans (Berger and 
Udell 1995).  The benefits derived from relationship lending are generally maximized when a 
single bank collects loan information.
8     
We match the small business information with bank balance sheet and income statement 
data from the Call Reports, the locations of bank branches and deposits from the Summary of 
Deposits, and data from other sources about the firm’s market environment.  Following prior 
research, we define a firm’s local market as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or non-MSA 
                                                           
8 Some lines of credit do not represent relationship lending.  In particular, lines of credit secured by 
accounts receivable and inventory are generally based on the value of the security, rather than the 
relationship.  In our empirical analysis, we control for whether the line is secured by accounts 
receivable/inventory versus other types of collateral.   11
rural county in which the small business is located.
9  Table 1 gives the definitions and summary 
statistics for the variables. 
A. Choice of LC bank 
In our first set of tests, we examine the probability that a small business has an LC with a 
bank in a particular size class using a logit functional form. The probability is modeled as a 
function of the size structure of the banking market, and controls for a number of market and firm 
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characteristics, firm characteristics) 
 
where P(• ) indicates probability, “firm has an LC at SIZE i BANK” is a dummy variable that is 
one if the firm’s most recent LC is at a bank in size class i, and SIZE i SHARE is the market share 
of banks of size class i in the local market.  We use four size classes based on a bank’s gross total 
assets (GTA).  Size class 1 denotes banks with GTA ≤  $100 million, size class 2 indicates banks 
with GTA of $100 million - $1 billion, size class 3 includes banks with GTA of $1 billion - $10 
billion, and size class 4 consists of banks GTA > $10 billion.  Thus, we estimate equation (1) four 
times, once each for the probability that the firm’s LC is from a bank in size i as a function of the 
market share of size i banks, i = 1,2,3,4.  For example, when the left hand side of the equation is 
based on the probability that a small business has an LC from a SIZE 2 bank, we put SIZE 2 
SHARE on the right hand side.  Our results are also robust to including three of the four market 
share variables (excluding one share as the base case). 
                                                           
9 Note that in some cases, the bank extending credit is not located in the firm’s local market.  In our sample, 
the median distance to the bank that issued the firm’s most recent LC is 3 miles, and in 90% of the cases, 
this bank was less than or equal to 25 miles away.  Recent research suggests that the portion of small 
business loans made at greater distances beyond these local market boundaries has been increasing (e.g., 
Cyrnak and Hannan 2000, Petersen and Rajan 2000).  However, to the extent that a few small businesses 
shop over a larger geographical area, our empirical results are biased against findings that local market bank 
size structure and concentration affect competition for small business lending.   12
We include control variables on the right hand side for bank market concentration, other 
market characteristics, and firm characteristics.  We measure bank market concentration using the 
Herfindahl index of deposits in the local banking market.
10  Other market variables include 
measures of M&A activity, entry, the condition of banks in the market, and state income growth.  
Variables that control for firm characteristics include financial ratios, size (both assets and sales), 
organizational structure, industry, growth, informational opacity, and the firm’s and firm owner’s 
payment and legal histories. 
A potential problem arises both here and in the literature in testing for the ability of larger 
banks to supply credit to small borrowers because this issue may be confounded with the inability 
of small banks to supply credit to larger borrowers.  When we include all the LCs and all the 
banks in our sample, we introduce a bias against finding that large banks grant disproportionately 
fewer LCs to small businesses.  This is because small banks are less able to make loans to the 
larger small businesses due to legal lending limits and problems of diversification.  Banks are 
generally prevented by regulators from exposing more than 15% of their equity capital to a single 
customer.  Thus, a bank cannot grant a $1 million LC unless it has at least $6.667 million in 
equity ($1 million / .15).  Some of our LCs are greater than $1 million and some of our banks 
have less than $6.667 million in equity.  Most of the studies of the effects of bank size and M&As 
on small business lending in the literature cited above grouped all loans under $1 million together 
and did not account for inability of the smallest banks to make loans at the high end of this 
interval. 
To focus on the ability of banks to make small business loans, we look at four subsamples 
of LCs – lines under $1 million, lines under $500,000, lines under $250,000, and lines under 
$100,000.  For the first three of these subsamples, we include only LCs from banks with enough 
equity to make all loans in the subsample under legal lending limits (we assume that all banks in 
our sample can make loans under $100,000).  That is, for the three subsamples, we include only 
LCs from banks with enough equity so that 15% of equity is at least equal to the maximum line in 
                                                           
10 Market concentration is based on deposits rather than loans, because there are no measures available for 
the locations of all of a bank’s loan customers. 
   13
the subsample.  For example, for the subsample of LCs under $1 million, we only include LCs at 
banks with at least $6.667 million in equity.  For these subsamples, we also use “restricted” 
measures of market size structure and the Herfindahl index – measures that include only banks 
with sufficient equity to be in the appropriate subsample.  Thus, for the subsample of LCs under 
$1 million, we use measures of SIZE 1 SHARE – SIZE 4 SHARE and HERF that are restricted to 
include the shares of only banks with equity of at least $6.667 million.  As a robustness check, we 
tried using unrestricted measures of market structure, and these gave similar results.   
B. Small business loan pricing 
The second part of our analysis tests the effects of banking market size structure, size of 
the lending bank, market concentration, and other factors on small business loan prices.  The 
general model is: 
 
(2)  LC interest rate premium = f (market size structure, bank size, bank market concentration 
and other market characteristics, firm characteristics, other bank characteristics, bank-
borrower relationship, loan contract variables) 
 
The interest rate premium (PREMIUM) is defined as the interest rate on the LC minus the bank’s 
prime rate.  Recall that in all cases, we focus on most recent LC. 
To measure market size structure, we use the shares of deposits held by banks of different 
size classes, SIZE 2 SHARE – SIZE 4 SHARE, with SIZE 1 SHARE excluded as the base case.   
Similarly, we include the dummies for the size class of the bank providing the LC, SIZE 2 BANK 
– SIZE 4 BANK, with SIZE 1 BANK excluded from the regressions as the base case.  We include 
the same measures of bank market concentration and other market characteristics, and firm 
characteristics as in equation (1).  We also include other factors that might affect the decisions of 
the small business and potential lending banks.  We include controls for the strength of the bank-
borrower relationship (measured by its length), and other bank variables (including M&As of the 
lending bank).  Finally, we also include loan contract terms for whether the LC is secured, 
whether it is guaranteed, and whether compensating balances are required to control for risks of   14
the loan not captured in the firm variables.  We recognize that the bank and firm negotiate these 
contract terms and the interest rate as part of a package, which introduces an endogeneity 
problem.  Because of this, we run our regressions both with and without contract terms, and the 
results are qualitatively similar.   
 
IV. Empirical results 
A. Choice of LC Bank 
The results for a logistic regression using equation (1) for the full sample are shown in 
Table 2.  For each variable, we show the parameter estimate, the marginal effect (i.e., the 
derivative of the probability with respect to the exogenous variable evaluated at the sample mean), 
and the P-value.  The shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.  Our focus is 
on the deposit share of the size of bank at which a firm has its LC as a proxy for these banks’ 
presence in local markets.  We ask how increasing the presence of a given size class of bank 
affects a small business’s probability of having its most recent LC from a bank of that size class.
11  
The regressions focusing on LCs from size class i banks are given in column i.  Each of these 
regressions include all 648 most recent loan LCs as observations, with the dependent variable 
equal to one if and only if the small business has an LC from a size class i bank.  At the bottom of 
each column, we show how many of the 648 LCs are from banks in the appropriate size class. 
In the regression in column 1, the coefficient on the size 1 deposit share is 4.259 with a 
marginal effect of 0.451 and statistical significance at well below the 1% level.   This equates to a 
marginal increase in the probability of having a loan from a size class 1 bank of 0.451 percentage 
points for a one percentage point increase in the deposit share of size 1 banks (evaluated at the 
                                                           
11 The results for both the choice of LC bank regressions and for the interest rate premium regressions 
discussed below are qualitatively similar when we use a Heckman correction for sample selection bias.  We 
first run a probit equation for the probability that the firm will be granted an LC on its last loan application, 
and then include the resulting inverse Mills ratio as a regressor in our equations (1) and (2).  There is a 
problem of identification for the Heckman correction, as we have no regressors in the first-stage probit that 
are not also in the second-stage equations.  Since we do not have any “true” exclusion restrictions, our 
sample selection correction is identified by the nonlinearity inherent in the inverse Mills ratio.  The use of 
the same underlying variables cannot be avoided, since all of the variables that affect the accept/reject 
decision may also affect the size of bank chosen, and the loan premium.  Fortunately, our results are robust 
to including or excluding this Heckman correction.   15
sample mean).
12  Some of the control variables are also statistically significant, suggesting that 
there are other important determinants of the size of bank from which a firm has its LCs. 
Of key interest here is whether, all else equal, small businesses are disproportionately 
more likely to obtain LCs from smaller banks than larger banks, as might be expected based on 
prior literature.  If this were the case, we would expect to find that the sensitivity of firms to the 
market shares of smaller banks exceeds the sensitivity to larger banks.  Put another way, small 
businesses would be more likely to respond favorably to an increase in the market share of small 
banks than to an increase in the share of large banks.  Based on the literature, the marginal effect 
should be substantially lower for the larger bank size classes.  The results shown in Table 2 are 
not consistent with this expectation.  Looking across the four size classes, the marginal effects are 
increasing in the bank size classes.  For banks in sizes classes 2, 3, and 4, the marginal increases 
are 0.622, 0.703, and 0.850 percentage points per percentage point increase in market shares, 
respectively. 
Looking at the other control variables, notice that the coefficient on the log of assets 
increases as we move from the first regression to the last regression.  This means that, all else 
equal, larger firms are more likely to go to larger banks.  Since the four regressions in Table 2 
cover all the possible LC options for firms, the coefficients on each control variable have to differ 
across the regressions.  A marginal effect reflects the contribution of a variable to the probability 
of having an LC from a bank of a particular size and the regressions cover all of the size classes. 
As discussed above, by including all the LCs and all the banks in the above analysis, there 
is likely a bias against finding that large banks grant disproportionately fewer LCs to small 
businesses because the smaller banks cannot make the larger loans.  To mitigate this bias, we also 
look at subsamples LCs under $1 million, under $500,000, under $250,000, and under $100,000.  
We include only LCs from banks with enough equity to make all loans in the subsample and we 
                                                           
12  The marginal increase in the probability that the dependent variable is one for an increase in a particular 
independent variable when evaluated at the sample mean is P• (1 – P)∙(coefficient), where P is the mean 
probability that the dependent variable is one (P = 78/648 for first column of Table 2).  Thus, the marginal 
increase in the probability of having an LC from a size class 1 bank when the share of size 1 deposits in the 
market is increased is (78/648)∙(1 – 78/648)∙(4.259) = 0.451.   16
also use only these banks when we calculate measures of market size structure and the Herfindahl 
index.  Table 3 shows the results for the subsample of LCs under $1 million. 
One problem we encounter in the subsample regressions is that the logistic regressions do 
not always converge.  When we examine LCs under $1 million, as shown in Table 3, the logistic 
regression for the size 1 bank dummy does not converge.  This is not surprising, given that most 
size class 1 banks (GTA ≤  $100 million) do not have the $6.667 million in equity needed to be 
included in the subsample.  There are only 19 firms in the subsample that received loans from size 
class 1 banks, fewer than the number of parameters being estimated.  Thus, the estimates 
presented in column 1 of Table 3 are unreliable, and we will not discuss them further. 
As bank sizes move from size class 2 to size class 4 in Table 3, the marginal effects 
associated with the restricted deposit share variables are 1.133, 0.782, and 1.002, respectively.  
These results suggest a U-shaped pattern, with changes in shares of size classes 2 and 4 having 
approximately equal effects in drawing small business LCs under $1 million to their size class. 
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of a change in the deposits of bank of size i on the 
probability that a small business has an LC with a bank of that size for all the subsamples.  The 
first column repeats the marginal effects for the subsample of LCs under $1 million from banks 
with at least $6.667 million in equity using the corresponding “restricted” measures of market size 
structure and Herfindahl index.  The remaining columns show the results for LCs under $500,000, 
under $250,000, and under $100,000 from banks with sufficient equity and using the 
corresponding restrictions on the market measures. 
Neglecting for the moment the results of the LCs under $100,000, the findings in Table 4 
are not consistent with the prior literature that indicated that large banks generally had difficulty 
making loans of up to $1 million to small businesses.  As noted above, for the LCs up to $1 
million, the marginal effects of the market shares follow a U-shaped pattern, and are 
approximately equal for size classes 2 and 4.  For LCs up to $500,000, the marginal effects are 
approximately equal across size classes 2 to 4, and for LCs up to $250,000, the marginal effects 
decline only slightly as size classes become larger.  For these three subsamples, the logistic   17
regressions for the size 1 bank dummy do not converge because there are too few size class 1 
banks with sufficient equity needed to be included in the subsample.  Of these results, only the 
subsample of LCs up to $250,000 give any indication that small businesses are more likely to 
borrow from smaller banks, and the slope in this is relatively mild, suggesting at most a relatively 
small effect. 
The results of the LCs under $100,000 are substantially different from the other results 
and may suggest that larger banks generally had difficulty making these very small loans.  The 
results shown in the last column of Table 4 suggest that the marginal effect declines from 1.005 
for size class 1 to 0.775 for size class 2.  The logistic regressions for the size 3 and size 4 bank 
dummies do not converge for this subsample.  We take both the decline in marginal effects 
between size classes 1 and 2 for the LCs under $100,000 and the nonconvergence for size classes 
3 and 4 as evidence consistent with the hypothesis that market behavior differs in important ways 
for LCs under $100,000. 
Thus, the data on the size of bank from which small businesses obtain their LCs contrasts 
sharply with the literature that showed that the ratio of small business loans of up to $1 million to 
bank assets declines dramatically with bank size.  We find that, with the possible exception of 
loans under $100,000, there is little evidence that larger banks make disproportionately fewer 
small business loans.
13  We believe that the difference between our findings and those in the 
extant literature is mainly due to the improved methodology.  We avoid the issue of taking bank 
assets as fixed.  We also reduce the potential problem that large banks may have different small 
business lending opportunities by accounting directly for the market presence of banks in different 
size classes.  As well, we are able to match small businesses to the banks in their local markets 
and include the characteristics of the small businesses themselves.  Our tests also include both 
direct effects of bank actions (e.g., a large bank that has a reduced supply of small business loans) 
and external effects (e.g., other incumbent or new banks that may pick up these loan customers). 
                                                           
13 We also tried excluding LCs under $100,000 from the full sample and from the other subsamples.  The 
results for the full sample and for and the subsample of LCs under $1 million are unchanged by this 
exclusion.  For the subsamples of LCs under $500,000 and under $250,000, the logistic regressions do not 
converge with this exclusion.   18
B. Small Business Loan Pricing 
We next turn to our results on small business loan pricing.  Table 5 presents the results 
from regressing PREMIUM on market size structure, bank size, market concentration, and other 
bank, market, firm, relationship, and loan contract variables.  This table shows the parameter 
estimates and P-values.  Again, the shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.   
The first column in Table 5 includes the bank size variables but not the market size 
structure variables.  The coefficients on the three bank size dummies are all negative, with the 
coefficients on size classes 2 and 3 significantly different from zero.  Thus, given the control 
variables in the regression, banks over $100 million in assets charge lower premiums than do 
banks below $100 million in assets (the excluded group).  The coefficients of -0.228, -0.411, and 
–0.285 imply that the premia charged by a size 2, size 3, and size 4 bank are 22.8, 41.1, and 28.5 
basis points lower than the premium charged by a size class 1 bank, respectively, all else equal.  
This is quite substantial when compared to the average interest rate premium in the sample of 121 
basis points.  The coefficients on the three bank size dummies are not significantly different from 
each other, suggesting that the most important difference is between size class 1 banks and all 
others. 
In the second column of Table 5, we present a regression that includes the market size 
structure variables but not the bank size variables.  The coefficients on all three size classes are 
negative and significantly different from zero.  This suggests that size structure matters, with a 
higher proportion of large banks in a market leading to lower interest rate spreads.  For every 
percentage point of market share that moves from size class 1 banks to size classes 2, 3, and 4, 
PREMIUM falls 0.464, 0.867, and 0.754 basis points respectively.   
An example may help illustrate the impact of market size structure on pricing.  We look at 
what the results imply would happen if a community moved from the 75
th percentile of MSAs in 
deposits in the smallest two size classes (banks with less than $1 billion in assets) to the 25
th 
percentile.  Using this measure, Midland, Texas is at the 75
th percentile, that is, it has more 
deposits in size class 1 and 2 banks than 75% of all MSAs, with 44% of deposits in these two size   19
classes (12% at size class 1 banks, 32% at size class 2 banks).  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is at the 
25
th percentile by this measure, with 15% of deposits in banks under $1 billion (2% in size class 1 
banks, 13% in size class 2 banks).  Our results suggest that a bank of any given size in Midland 
will, on average and all else equal, have a loan interest rate that is 15 basis points higher than a 
bank of the same size in Philadelphia.  Since the average premium is 121 basis points, this is a 
substantial difference.   
The third column of Table 5 has the full specification, which gives the results of a horse 
race between market size structure and bank size.  When both the size structure variables and the 
bank size variables are included, only the coefficients of the size structure variables remain 
generally statistically significantly negative and similar in magnitude to those in the regression in 
column 2.  Again, we find the same 15 basis point difference between a bank in Midland and a 
similar-sized bank in Philadelphia, all else equal. 
In the full specification, the coefficients of the bank size dummies remain negative, but 
they are much reduced and are not statistically significant.  Thus, to some degree, bank size may 
have served as a proxy for the missing size structure variables in the regression in the first column 
of Table 5. 
Turning to the other variables in column 3 of Table 5, we find that having a longer 
relationship with a bank reduces the interest rate spread in the main regression, consistent with 
earlier findings.  Interest rate spreads are also significantly higher in more concentrated markets, 
consistent with prior research.  Unlike these prior studies, however, we control for firm 
characteristics, as well as for bank size and market size structure.  In terms of firm characteristics, 
most of the coefficients on the control variables are not statistically significant with the exceptions 
being sales, business delinquencies and expenditure on research and development.  These 
coefficients all have the expected signs, with riskier or more opaque firms paying higher rates. 
Finally, the coefficients on the loan contract term variables are all significant and of the 
predicted direction.  Loans that are secured or guaranteed bear higher rates, as found in prior 
research, and compensating balances reduce the interest rate on average, as expected.     20
Recognizing the endogeneity problem discussed above, we show the main regression without 
these contract terms in the final column of Table 5.  The results are qualitatively similar to the 
regression with contract terms.  Without the contract terms, size structure still wins the horse race, 
since the market size structure variables are statistically significant while the bank size dummies 
are not.  
In Table 6 we delve further into the issue of why small businesses tend to pay lower rates 
in markets with greater shares for larger banks by running the PREMIUM regressions for 
subsamples of the data.  We first split the sample into small businesses in banking markets with 
greater or less than median shares of deposits in the smallest two bank size classes.  In the first 
column, we show the results for firms in “small-bank markets” in which market shares of banks 
with less than $1 billion in assets are greater than the median of 24.91%, and in the second 
column we show “large-bank markets” in which market shares of the two smallest size classes 
totals less than 24.91%.  
The results from column 1 of Table 6 suggest that in markets in which small banks have a 
strong presence, market size structure matters.  The coefficients on the size structure variables are 
of about the same magnitudes as in the full sample tests (compare to column 3 of Table 5).  
Increasing small bank presence in a small-bank dominated market increases the interest rate 
spread at banks of all sizes.  However, as in the earlier results, the interest rate premium is not 
significantly related to bank size.  On the other hand, in large-bank dominated markets (column 2 
of Table 6), the coefficients on the size structure variables are statistically insignificant and 
positive.  In these markets, the coefficients of the bank size dummies are also statistically 
insignificant and much smaller than for the full sample shown in Table 5, column 3.  The results 
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 imply that size structure matters more in markets with a 
large concentration of small banks.  Once the share of large banks is sufficiently great, neither size 
structure nor bank size seems to have much effect on pricing. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show the results when we divide the sample into two parts by 
the size of the lending banks.  The small-bank sample shown in column 3 of the table includes all   21
small businesses with LCs from banks with assets less than or equal to $1 billion, and the large-
bank sample shown in column 4 has all the firms with loans from banks with assets above $1 
billion.  The data suggest that size structure is less important in determining loan prices for small 
banks (column 3) than it is for large banks (column 4).  None of the size structure variables are 
statistically significant for the small-bank sample. 
Our pricing results as a whole strongly suggest that market size structure is important to 
bank price behavior and that banks compete less aggressively in markets dominated by small 
banks.  We find that small business loan rates are lower in markets dominated by large banks, that 
size structure is only statistically significant in the markets with relatively high small-bank 
presence, and that size structure affects the prices of large banks but not small banks. 
We also tried a number of additional robustness checks.  Dividing up the sample by size 
of the market (total market deposits) appeared to have no material effect on the results – banks 
appear to behave similarly in large and small markets, all else equal.  We also tested measuring 
the bank size classes by the assets in all the banks in the bank’s holding company (if any).  The 
main results were again preserved, although the bank size variables were somewhat more 
significant and the size structure variables were slightly less significant. 
 
V. Conclusions 
The consolidation of the banking industry has raised concern about the supply of credit to 
small businesses.  We address this concern in two ways.  First, we introduce a new and better way 
to examine whether small businesses have loans with larger versus smaller banks that avoids 
many of the difficulties in the prior literature on small business credit availability.  Second, we 
examine whether market size structure  affects small business loan pricing.  In both analyses, we 
find that bank market size structure– the distribution of market shares of different size classes of 
banks in a local market – plays an important role.  Earlier research has generally ignored market 
size structure altogether, and no prior study has examined the effects of both bank size and bank 
market size structure.   22
Previous studies of small business lending have often concluded that small businesses are 
disproportionately less likely to have loans from larger banks.  They drew these conclusions in 
part by examining the ratio of small business loans to total assets at small and large banks.  In 
most cases, small business loans were defined as loans to businesses with credits less than $1 
million.  We believe that this approach can give misleading results because it explicitly or 
implicitly assumes that bank assets are fixed, and thus ignores the possibility that large banks 
expand the denominator of the ratio, their total assets.  As well, this approach in the literature does 
not take into account potential systematic differences in the distributions of small business loan 
customers in markets in which large and small banks compete or the characteristics of the 
individual small businesses that receive loans from large and small banks.  In addition, the 
findings of this literature may not be fully revealing, since the loans to businesses with credits 
under $1 million may be heterogeneous and include some loans to large businesses. 
Our approach avoids these potential problems by examining small business lending from 
the point of view of the small business, rather than from the bank’s perspective.  We ask whether 
the chances of obtaining a line of credit (LC) from a large bank versus a small bank is roughly in 
proportion to the market presence of large versus small banks.  We do not assume that bank assets 
are fixed; we account for the presence of banks of different sizes in the firm’s local market; and 
we include firm characteristics in the analysis.  In addition, we differentiate among the sizes of 
LCs under $1 million and include only loans to small businesses (fewer than 500 full-time 
equivalent employees). 
Our findings are not consistent with the prior literature that indicated that large banks 
generally had difficulty issuing credits of up to $1 million to small businesses.  We find that, all 
else equal, the likelihood that a small business borrows from a bank of a given size is roughly 
proportional to the local market presence of banks of that size, although there are indications that 
very small loans (LCs under $100,000) and very small banks (GTA under $100 million) might be 
different.  Large banks tend to make relatively few of the very small loans and small banks tend to 
make relatively few of the larger loans.  We believe that the difference between our findings and 
those in the extant literature is mainly due to the improved methodology.   23
We also contribute to the literature on loan pricing.  This literature often examined the 
effects of bank concentration, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and bank-borrower relationship, 
but generally did not evaluate the effects of bank size or market size structure, which may have 
important effects on the way banks compete.  In addition, some of the studies either excluded 
bank variables entirely or small business variables entirely, which may have created biases.  Our 
analysis of small business loan prices charged by banks is much more comprehensive than those 
in this literature and includes bank size, banking market size structure, market concentration, 
M&As, bank-borrower relationships, and other bank and firm characteristics. 
We find that market size structure is important to bank loan pricing and appears to affect 
prices more than bank size, even after controlling for conventional market concentration and other 
market and firm characteristics.  In particular, we find that interest rates on small business LCs are 
lower when large banks dominate a market, all else equal, than when small banks dominate.  Our 
market size structure results suggest that banks compete differently in markets dominated by small 
banks than in markets dominated by large banks, and in particular that banks may compete less 
aggressively in markets dominated by small banks. 
We find two pieces of additional evidence in support of this conclusion.  First, we find 
that size structure is only statistically significant in the markets with relatively high small bank 
presence.  Second, we find that size structure primarily affects the prices of large banks, rather 
than small banks. 
Our findings may help offer predictions on potential effects of banking industry 
consolidation on small business lending.  They suggest that consolidating M&As may have 
relatively little effect on small business credit availability except for very small loans (less than 
$100,000) and for M&As that involve very small banks (less than $100 million GTA).  If 
consolidation proceeds as it has in the U.S. – with large banking organizations primarily 
expanding into different local markets – then small business loan prices may decline in some of 
these markets.  In particular, prices may decline in local markets that move from being dominated 
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Premium   
regressions 





Dependent variable          
PREMIUM  Premium over the Prime Rate on the line of credit  1.20  0.90  1.21  0.90 
Size structure          
SIZE 1 SHARE  Proportion of deposits in the market at banks in size class 1 (less than 
$100M GTA) 
0.12 0.19 0.11  0.19 
SIZE 2 SHARE  Proportion of deposits in the market at banks in size class 2 ($100M-
$1B GTA) 
0.27 0.23 0.25  0.22 
SIZE 3 SHARE  Proportion of deposits in the market at banks in size class 3 ($1B-
$10B GTA) 
0.32 0.25 0.32  0.24 
SIZE 4 SHARE  Proportion of deposits in the market at banks in size class 4 (over 
$10B GTA) 
0.30 0.27 0.32  0.27 
Bank variables          
SIZE 1 BANK  Dummy for whether the bank a firm has an LC at is of size class 1 
less than $100M GTA) 
0.12 0.33 0.11  0.31 
SIZE 2 BANK  Dummy for whether the bank a firm has an LC at is of size class 2 
($100M-$1B GTA) 
0.33 0.47 0.32  0.47 
SIZE 3 BANK  Dummy for whether the bank a firm has an LC at is of size class 3 
($1B-$10B GTA) 
0.31 0.46 0.32  0.47 
SIZE 4 BANK  Dummy for whether the bank a firm has an LC at is of size class 4 
(over $10B GTA) 
0.25 0.43 0.25  0.43 
Bank-firm relationship variable        
RELATE LENGTH  Length of relationship with LC bank  2.05  0.72  2.06  0.74 
Other banking market variables        
HERFINDAHL  Market variable: Herfindahl ratio based on market deposits  0.19  0.11  0.19  0.11 
DE NOVO ENTRY  Dummy for whether there is de novo entry in the local banking 
market in the past 3 years 
0.24 0.43 0.25  0.43 
MKT MERGERS  Market variable:  share of local market deposits at banks involved in 
mergers averaged over the past 3 years 
0.15 0.10 0.15  0.09 
MKT ACQUISITIONS  Market variable:  share of local market deposits in banks that retain 
their charters but change top-tier bank holding company ownership 
averaged over the past 3 years 
0.03 0.06 0.03  0.06 
MKT BANK GROWTH  Market variable:  growth rate of bank deposits in the local market  -0.02  0.11  -0.02  0.11 
STATE INC GROWTH  Real state income growth  0.04  0.01  0.03  0.01 
MSA DUMMY  Dummy for whether the firm is in an MSA  0.78  0.41  0.80  0.40 
MKT BANK ROE  Market variable:  average bank ROE weighted by deposits  0.12  0.05  0.12  0.05 
MKT BK NONPERF  Market variable: average nonperforming loans to total loans ratio 
weighted by deposits 
0.04 0.02 0.04  0.02 
MKT BK EQ-to-ASSET  Market variable: average equity-to-assets ratio weighted by deposits  0.08  0.01  0.08  0.01 
MKT PCT BANK FAIL  Market variable:  percent of banks in the market that failed in the past 
3 years 
0.03 0.07 0.03  0.07 
Other bank variables          
BK MERGERS  Merger dummy for the bank: has the bank engaged in a merger in the 
past 3 years 
0.35 0.48 0.37  0.48   28
BK ACQUISITIONS  Merger dummy for the bank: has the bank retained it charter but 
changed top-tier holding company in the past 3 years 
0.08 0.26 0.09  0.28 
MULTI BHC  Multibank holding company dummy  0.66  0.47  0.67  0.47 
OUT OF STATE BHC  Bank is a member of an out-of-state bank holding company  0.25  0.44  0.27  0.44 
BK ROE  Bank return on equity (ROE)  0.12  0.12  0.07  0.02 
BK EQUITY RATIO  Bank equity-to-assets ratio  0.07  0.02  0.12  0.12 
BK NONPERF LOANS  Bank nonperforming loans to total loans ratio  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03 
Firm variables         
FIRM AGE  Age of firm  2.70  0.54  2.73  0.54 
LEVERAGE Firm  leverage  0.61  0.36  0.62  0.37 
PROFIT MARGIN  Firm profit margin  0.07  0.19  0.06  0.18 
CURRENT RATIO  Firm current ratio  1.77  1.72  1.65  1.69 
QUICK RATIO  Firm quick ratio  -2.39  8.16  -2.54  8.16 
AR TURNOVER  Firm AR turnover  35.99  31.76  38.89  32.40 
INV TURNOVER  Firm inventory turnover  52.13  93.94  56.74  97.47 
AP TURNOVER  Firm accounts payable turnover  32.03  52.53  36.47  55.49 
Ln(ASSETS)  Firm log of total assets  13.91  1.79  14.08  1.76 
Ln(SALES)  Firm log of total sales  14.90  1.68  15.08  1.62 
PERS DELINQ  Dummy indicating principle owner has been 60 or more days 
delinquent on personal obligations over the past three years 
0.05 0.22 0.05  0.21 
BUS DELINQ  Dummy indicating business has been 60 or more days delinquent over
the past three years 
0.19 0.39 0.18  0.39 
JUDGMENT  Dummy indicating judgment rendered against principal owner during 
the past three years 
0.04 0.19 0.04  0.19 
CORPORATION  Dummy for whether the firm is a corporation  0.54  0.50  0.57  0.50 
SUBCHAPTER S  Dummy for whether the firm is a Subchapter S firm  0.31  0.46  0.30  0.46 
PARTNERSHIP  Dummy for whether the firm is a partnership  0.06  0.23  0.06  0.24 
PROPRIETORSHIP  Dummy for whether the firm is a sole proprietorship  0.09  0.29  0.08  0.27 
OWNER MANAGED  Dummy for whether the firm is owner-managed  0.73  0.44  0.74  0.44 
FAMILY OWNED  Dummy for whether the firm ownership is more than 50% 
concentrated in a single family 
0.76 0.43 0.74  0.44 
CONSTR  Dummy for whether the firm is in construction  0.11  0.31  0.11  0.32 
SERVICES  Dummy for whether the firm is in services  0.25  0.43  0.23  0.42 
RETAIL  Dummy for whether the firm is in retail  0.18  0.38  0.16  0.37 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH  Firm employee growth  0.05  0.16  0.05  0.17 
SALES GROWTH  Firm sales growth  0.39  0.71  0.36  0.69 
PPE-to-ASSETS  Firm PPE to assets ratio  0.34  0.27  0.33  0.26 
R&D EMPLOYEES  Firm R&D to employees ratio  0.04  0.14  0.04  0.13 
Loan contract variables          
SECURE AR/INV  Dummy for whether the loan is secured by accounts receivable    
(AR) or inventory 
0.40 0.49 0.42  0.49 
SECURE OTHER  Dummy for whether the loan is secured by securities other than       
AR or inventory 
0.25 0.43 0.21  0.41 
GUARANTEED  LC is guaranteed  0.62  0.49  0.62  0.49 
COMP BALANCES  Compensating balances dummy  0.10  0.30  0.11  0.31 
Number of observations    648  520 
  
Table 2.  Choice of a bank for a line of credit.  
Logistic regressions for the probability that a small business has its most recent line of credit at a bank of a particular size.  Each dependent variable is based a dummy that has the 
value one if the bank is of the given size and is zero otherwise.  The reported number is the "marginal effect" of a change in SIZE i SHARE, where i is the size class and the 
marginal effect is the marginal predicted change in the probability of having a LC from the stated size class of bank, given a change in the independent variable, evaluated at the 
sample mean.  The shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.   
Dependent variable:  SIZE 1 BANK  SIZE 2 BANK  SIZE 3 BANK  SIZE 4 BANK 
   Parameter  Marginal Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             
                                  
INTERCEPT  3.270  0.346 0.237  -2.022 -0.444 0.258  -2.472 -0.528 0.197  -6.232 -1.154 0.006 
Size structure                                 
SIZE 1 SHARE  4.259  0.451  0.000                         
SIZE 2 SHARE          2.831  0.622  0.000                 
SIZE 3 SHARE                  3.295  0.703  0.000         
SIZE 4 SHARE                          4.589  0.850  0.000 
Other banking market variables                                
HERFINDAHL 2.582  0.273  0.128  -3.186  -0.700  0.009 -0.071  -0.015 0.957  2.165 0.401 0.175 
DE NOVO ENTRY  0.081  0.009  0.863  -0.131  -0.029  0.611  0.119  0.025  0.650  0.018  0.003  0.952 
MKT  MERGERS  -1.647 -0.174 0.372  1.384  0.304 0.226  -0.828 -0.177 0.482  -0.007 -0.001 0.996 
MKT  ACQUISITIONS  -3.633 -0.385 0.248  -0.173 -0.038 0.917  0.981  0.209  0.572  1.143  0.212  0.596 
MKT  BANK  GROWTH  0.649  0.069 0.629  -0.011 -0.002 0.991  -0.195 -0.042 0.826  -0.009 -0.002 0.993 
STATE INC GROWTH  2.356  0.249  0.891  9.189  2.018  0.386  -0.564  -0.120  0.959  -19.274  -3.569  0.140 
MSA  DUMMY  0.498  0.053 0.336  -0.024 -0.005 0.942  -0.218 -0.046 0.543  0.341  0.063  0.454 
MKT BANK ROE  -7.082  -0.750  0.055 1.343 0.295  0.577 -2.429  -0.518  0.306 1.849 0.342 0.478 
MKT BK NONPERF  -22.752  -2.409  0.070 11.584 2.544 0.143 -1.182 -0.252 0.880 -13.048  -2.416 0.180 
BK EQUITY RATIO  -3.507  -0.371  0.831  17.518  3.847  0.158  -9.075  -1.936  0.492  0.182  0.034  0.992 
MKT PCT BANK FAIL  -0.481  -0.051  0.852  -1.109  -0.244  0.485  -0.084  -0.018  0.956  1.813  0.336  0.283 
Firm variables                                 
FIRM  AGE  -0.039  -0.004  0.902 0.062 0.014 0.747 0.277 0.059 0.165 -0.324  -0.060  0.132 
LEVERAGE  -0.291 -0.031 0.485  0.359  0.079 0.182  -0.215 -0.046 0.466  -0.272 -0.050 0.426 
PROFIT  MARGIN  0.365 0.039 0.642 0.262 0.058 0.594  0.056 0.012 0.915 -0.812  -0.150 0.190 
CURRENT RATIO  0.013  0.001  0.896  0.116  0.026  0.059  -0.075 -0.016 0.244  -0.081 -0.015 0.266 
QUICK  RATIO  0.013 0.001 0.580 0.001 0.000 0.916 -0.007  -0.002 0.591  0.001 0.000 0.922 
AR  TURNOVER  -0.006 -0.001 0.409  0.003  0.001 0.380  -0.003 -0.001 0.385  0.001  0.000  0.832 
INV  TURNOVER  0.004 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.784 -0.002 0.000 0.317  0.000 0.000 0.898 
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Table 2 continued. 
 
Dependent variable:  SIZE 1 BANK  SIZE 2 BANK  SIZE 3 BANK  SIZE 4 BANK 
   Parameter  Marginal Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             
AP  TURNOVER  -0.001 0.000 0.795  0.000 0.000 0.901  0.002 0.000 0.501  0.000 0.000 0.948 
Ln(ASSETS)  -0.341  -0.036  0.058 -0.152  -0.033  0.229 0.092 0.020 0.503 0.314  0.058  0.047 
Ln(SALES)  -0.009 -0.001 0.961  -0.023 -0.005 0.865  0.029  0.006  0.840  -0.032 -0.006 0.847 
PERS  DELINQ  -0.167 -0.018 0.716  0.177  0.039  0.496  -0.386 -0.082 0.172  0.207  0.038  0.483 
BUS  DELINQ  0.793 0.084 0.186 -0.690  -0.152  0.140 0.135 0.029 0.782 0.330 0.061 0.560 
JUDGMENT  0.853 0.090 0.194 -0.313  -0.069  0.551 0.692 0.148 0.204 -1.443  -0.267  0.075 
CORPORATION  -0.380  -0.040  0.459 0.506 0.111 0.185 0.190 0.041 0.688 0.308 0.057 0.587 
SUBCHAPTER  S  -0.167  -0.018  0.754 0.195 0.043 0.621 0.436 0.093 0.365 0.202 0.037 0.725 
PARTNERSHIP -1.056  -0.112  0.248  1.130  0.248  0.032 -0.285  -0.061  0.650 0.045 0.008 0.952 
OWNER  MANAGED  -0.005 0.000 0.990  0.037 0.008 0.866  0.089 0.019 0.693 -0.068  -0.013 0.783 
FAMILY  OWNED  -0.153 -0.016 0.713  0.108  0.024  0.649  -0.338 -0.072 0.158  0.477  0.088  0.085 
CONSTR  0.459 0.049 0.362 0.113 0.025 0.726 -0.299  -0.064  0.372 -0.144  -0.027  0.710 
SERVICES  -0.547 -0.058 0.230  -0.173 -0.038 0.509  0.155  0.033  0.568  0.252  0.047  0.403 
RETAIL  0.412 0.044 0.315 0.071 0.016 0.792 -0.426  -0.091  0.153 0.180 0.033 0.589 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH  1.574  0.167  0.069  -1.572  -0.345  0.015  1.054  0.225  0.078 -0.267  -0.049  0.689 
SALES  GROWTH  -0.017 -0.002 0.937  0.005  0.001  0.971  -0.024 -0.005 0.872  0.026  0.005  0.874 
PPE-to-ASSETS  1.435  0.152  0.030 0.018 0.004  0.967 -0.798  -0.170  0.090 0.366 0.068  0.500 
R&D  EMPLOYEES  -0.220 -0.023 0.847  0.076  0.017  0.907  -0.048 -0.010 0.950  -0.010 -0.002 0.991 
                                  
Pseudo  R-sq  0.312 0.116 0.153 0.234 
Observations  648 648 648 648 
Number of LCs at that size 
bank 78  211  200  159 
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Table 3.  Choice of a bank for a line of credit for LCs under $1 million issued by banks with at least $6.667 million in equity.  
Logistic regressions for the probability that a small business has its most recent line of credit at a bank of a particular size.  Each dependent variable is based a dummy that has the 
value one if the bank is of the given size and is zero otherwise.  The reported number is the "marginal effect" of a change in SIZE i SHARE, where i is the size class and the 
marginal effect is the marginal predicted change in the probability of having a LC from the stated size class of bank, given a change in the independent variable, evaluated at the 
sample mean.  The shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.   
 
Dependent variable:  SIZE 1 BANK *  SIZE 2 BANK  SIZE 3 BANK  SIZE 4 BANK 
   Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate effect             
                      
INTERCEPT  -1.815 -0.077 0.803  -6.124 -1.485 0.016  1.297  0.277  0.622  -5.768 -1.029  0.074 
Size  structure                 
SIZE 1 SHARE  9.978  0.425  0.000             
SIZE 2 SHARE        4.671  1.132  0.000            
SIZE 3 SHARE              3.657  0.782  0.000      
SIZE  4  SHARE              5.617  1.002  0.000 
Other banking market variables                     
HERFINDAHL -0.859  -0.037  0.603  -1.377  -0.334  0.003 0.342  0.073  0.463 1.924  0.343  0.001 
DE NOVO ENTRY  1.063  0.045  0.265  0.165  0.040  0.588  -0.276  -0.059  0.396  0.503  0.090  0.187 
MKT  MERGERS  1.392 0.059 0.783  2.051 0.497 0.178 -2.607  -0.558  0.081 1.002 0.179  0.592 
MKT ACQUISITIONS  -22.470  -0.957  0.047 1.545 0.375 0.434 -1.180  -0.252  0.567  3.379 0.603 0.192 
MKT BANK GROWTH  5.162  0.220  0.178  -1.005  -0.244  0.393  0.735  0.157  0.515  -1.150  -0.205  0.385 
STATE  INC  GROWTH  38.065 1.622 0.378  4.207 1.020 0.741  7.529 1.610 0.566 -53.222  -9.494  0.005 
MSA  DUMMY  -0.621 -0.026 0.650  0.520  0.126  0.246  -0.478 -0.102 0.285  1.137  0.203  0.076 
MKT BANK ROE  -3.688  -0.157  0.673  3.263  0.791  0.287  -0.788  -0.169  0.794  -5.056  -0.902  0.146 
MKT BK NONPERF  0.159  0.007  0.996  28.868  6.999  0.007 -7.333  -1.568  0.471 -32.263  -5.755  0.021 
BK EQUITY RATIO  -1.649  -0.070  0.971  23.374  5.667  0.194  -28.553  -6.106  0.123  24.248  4.326  0.342 
MKT PCT BANK FAIL  4.787  0.204  0.399  -0.608  -0.147  0.774  0.288  0.062  0.888  1.856  0.331  0.432 
Firm variables                 
FIRM  AGE  0.708 0.030 0.413  0.176 0.043 0.486 -0.107  -0.023  0.685 -0.032 -0.006 0.910 
LEVERAGE  -2.919  -0.124  0.043  0.767  0.186  0.034 -0.377  -0.081  0.321 -0.376  -0.067 0.401 
PROFIT  MARGIN  -1.560 -0.066 0.453  0.610  0.148  0.308  -0.365 -0.078 0.569  -0.898 -0.160  0.222 
CURRENT RATIO  -0.461  -0.020  0.140  0.158  0.038  0.046 -0.088  -0.019  0.281 -0.090  -0.016 0.337 
QUICK  RATIO  0.091 0.004 0.489  0.021 0.005 0.235 -0.022  -0.005  0.176  0.003 0.001 0.870 
AR  TURNOVER  0.016 0.001 0.489  0.002 0.000 0.716 -0.002  -0.001  0.634 -0.001 0.000 0.806 
INV TURNOVER  0.008  0.000  0.540  0.004  0.001  0.081 -0.002  0.000 0.446 -0.003  -0.001 0.316   32
Table 3 continued. 
 
Dependent variable:  SIZE 1 BANK *  SIZE 2 BANK  SIZE 3 BANK  SIZE 4 BANK 
   Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Marginal  Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate Effect             Estimate effect             
AP  TURNOVER  -0.009  0.000  0.715 -0.006  -0.001  0.147 0.002  0.000  0.721 0.005  0.001  0.313 
Ln(ASSETS)  -1.120  -0.048  0.173 -0.067  -0.016  0.679 0.008  0.002  0.962 0.193  0.034  0.316 
Ln(SALES)  0.685 0.029 0.433 0.025 0.006 0.885  0.053 0.011 0.771 -0.083  -0.015  0.677 
PERS  DELINQ  0.222 0.009 0.852 0.342 0.083 0.288 -0.448  -0.096  0.218  0.015 0.003 0.968 
BUS  DELINQ  0.675  0.029  0.686 -0.713  -0.173  0.230 0.326  0.070  0.613 0.572  0.102  0.464 
JUDGMENT  -10.424  -0.444 0.981  -0.477 -0.116 0.490  0.775  0.166  0.281  -0.553 -0.099 0.547 
CORPORATION  -0.558 -0.024 0.674  -0.210 -0.051 0.672  -0.092 -0.020 0.864  0.443  0.079  0.501 
SUBCHAPTER  S  -0.631  -0.027  0.655 -0.327  -0.079  0.524 0.133  0.028  0.810 0.191  0.034  0.778 
PARTNERSHIP  -12.222  -0.521  0.968 0.803 0.195 0.225 -0.454  -0.097  0.533 -0.001  0.000 0.999 
OWNER  MANAGED  1.845  0.079  0.149  -0.231 -0.056 0.410  0.195  0.042  0.521  -0.019 -0.003 0.953 
FAMILY OWNED  -0.650  -0.028  0.506  0.310  0.075  0.323  -0.671  -0.143  0.037  0.702  0.125  0.063 
CONSTR  1.785 0.076 0.113 0.013 0.003 0.973 -0.270  -0.058  0.511 -0.059  -0.011  0.900 
SERVICES  -1.069  -0.046  0.444 -0.539  -0.131  0.101 0.093  0.020  0.786 0.582  0.104  0.119 
RETAIL  1.861  0.079  0.107  -0.158 -0.038 0.649  -0.129 -0.028 0.729  0.276  0.049  0.532 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH  3.934  0.168  0.039  -2.239  -0.543  0.009 1.174  0.251  0.148 0.423  0.075  0.646 
SALES  GROWTH  0.663  0.028  0.223  -0.038 -0.009 0.822  -0.040 -0.009 0.822  0.011  0.002  0.956 
PPE-to-ASSETS  1.759 0.075 0.406 0.288 0.070 0.597 -0.534  -0.114  0.360  0.327 0.058 0.642 
R&D  EMPLOYEES  -5.732  -0.244  0.417 -0.886  -0.215  0.267 0.719  0.154  0.401 0.137  0.024  0.891 
                            
Pseudo R-sq  0.534  0.203  0.194  0.267 
Observations 426  426  426  426 
Number of LCs at that size 
bank 19  176  132  99 
 
* -- Logistic regression does not converge.  Coefficient estimates are unreliable. 
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Table 4.  Choice of a bank for a line of credit for subsamples – Marginal effects shown only.  
Logistic regressions for the probability that a small business has its most recent line of credit at a bank of a particular 
size.  Each dependent variable is based a dummy that has the value one if the bank is of the given size and is zero 
otherwise.  All regressions include the other control variables used in the regressions in Table 2.  The reported number 
is the "marginal effect" of a change in SIZE i SHARE, where i is the size class and the marginal effect is the marginal 
predicted change in the probability of having a LC from the stated size class of bank, given a change in the independent 
variable, evaluated at the sample mean. The shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Size class 
Lines of credit <  
$1 million, bank 
equity > $6.667 
million. 
Lines of credit < 
$500,000, bank 
equity > $3.333 
million. 
Lines of credit < 
$250,000, bank 
equity > $1.667 
million. 
All lines of credit   
< $100,000. 
 
          
1 DNC  DNC  DNC 1.005 
2 1.132 0.847 0.937 0.775 
3 0.782 0.868 0.865  DNC 
4 1.002 0.866 0.829  DNC 
 
Note:  The coefficients on which the marginal effects are based are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  




   34
Table 5.  Regression of interest rate spread (PREMIUM) on size structure and bank size. 
OLS regressions for the interest rate spread.  The dependent variable in all the regressions in this table is PREMIUM, 
the spread over the prime rate of the bank loan.  The regressions have different combinations of independent variables 
using the same data set.  The shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
Dependent variable:    PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM 
   Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate              Estimate              Estimate              Estimate             
                   
INTERCEPT  3.529  0.000  4.101  0.000  4.055  0.000  4.271  0.000 
Size structure               
SIZE 2 SHARE      -0.464  0.096 -0.467 0.106 -0.526  0.070 
SIZE 3 SHARE      -0.867  0.001  -0.821  0.004  -0.882  0.002 
SIZE 4 SHARE      -0.754  0.012  -0.795  0.015  -0.854  0.009 
Bank variables               
SIZE 2 BANK  -0.228  0.099     -0.145 0.306 -0.166 0.246 
SIZE 3 BANK  -0.411  0.010     -0.249 0.134 -0.274 0.101 
SIZE  4  BANK  -0.285 0.116     -0.114 0.555 -0.118 0.541 
Bank-firm relationship variable           
RELATE LENGTH  -0.084  0.133  -0.099  0.074  -0.094  0.091  -0.107  0.054 
Other banking market variables               
HERFINDAHL 0.667  0.157  0.969  0.042  0.947  0.048  1.058  0.028 
DE NOVO ENTRY  -0.015  0.877  0.012  0.907  -0.003  0.978  0.004  0.970 
MKT  MERGERS  0.267 0.550 0.610 0.180 0.544 0.262 0.585 0.232 
MKT  ACQUISITIONS  -0.285 0.673 -0.504 0.448 -0.236 0.732 -0.065 0.925 
MKT  BANK  GROWTH  0.459 0.148 0.415 0.188 0.410 0.194 0.417 0.190 
STATE  INC  GROWTH  1.892 0.650 1.559 0.710 1.899 0.650 2.091 0.621 
MSA  DUMMY  -0.078 0.538 0.113 0.418 0.102 0.467 0.106 0.451 
MKT  BANK  ROE  1.319 0.128 0.688 0.413 1.436  0.100  1.541  0.081 
MKT  BK  NONPERF  0.692 0.216 0.709 0.199 0.645 0.250 8.345  0.016 
MKT  BK  EQ-to-ASSET  -2.269 0.641 -2.676 0.566 -6.743 0.190 -7.394 0.152 
MKT PCT BANK FAIL  6.808  0.037  6.085  0.040  8.704  0.012 0.782 0.166 
Other bank variables              
BK  MERGERS  0.008 0.935     -0.009 0.926 -0.019 0.838 
BK ACQUISITIONS  -0.223  0.120      -0.272  0.059  -0.259  0.076 
MULTI  BHC  -0.026 0.794     -0.054 0.582 -0.083 0.399 
OUT OF STATE BHC  0.100  0.290      0.117  0.215  0.130  0.173 
BK ROE  -0.553  0.110      -0.646  0.063 -0.554 0.112 
BK EQUITY RATIO  2.642  0.358      3.234  0.258  3.119  0.277 
BK  NONPERF  LOANS  -1.920 0.288     -2.734 0.133 -2.546 0.162 
Firm variables                 
FIRM  AGE  -0.076 0.331 -0.084 0.279 -0.084 0.283 -0.114 0.146 
LEVERAGE  0.019 0.860 0.052 0.621 0.031 0.766 0.078 0.461 
PROFIT  MARGIN  0.176 0.380 0.187 0.347 0.141 0.480 0.156 0.439 
CURRENT  RATIO  0.024 0.318 0.027 0.262 0.031 0.197 0.029 0.238 
QUICK  RATIO  0.005 0.285 0.007 0.149 0.007 0.192 0.006 0.207 
AR  TURNOVER  0.000 0.772 0.000 0.740 0.000 0.745 0.001 0.592 
INV  TURNOVER  -0.001 0.403 0.000 0.512 -0.001 0.362 -0.001 0.394 
AP  TURNOVER  0.001 0.251 0.001 0.277 0.001 0.215 0.001 0.286 
Ln(ASSETS)  -0.032 0.547 -0.041 0.432 -0.027 0.609 -0.033 0.534   35
Table 5 continued. 
 
Dependent variable:    PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM 
   Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate              Estimate              Estimate              Estimate             
Ln(SALES)  -0.134  0.016  -0.143  0.010  -0.139  0.012  -0.131  0.019 
PERS  DELINQ  0.057 0.753 0.062 0.732 0.058 0.750 0.070 0.701 
BUS DELINQ  0.401  0.000  0.399  0.000  0.412  0.000  0.433  0.000 
JUDGMENT  -0.095 0.624 -0.132 0.492 -0.164 0.397 -0.175 0.370 
CORPORATION  0.041 0.800 0.049 0.761 0.085 0.596 0.143 0.366 
SUBCHAPTER  S  0.007 0.966 0.033 0.840 0.063 0.704 0.090 0.582 
PARTNERSHIP  -0.162 0.453 -0.102 0.635 -0.081 0.707 -0.069 0.744 
OWNER  MANAGED  -0.014 0.869 -0.027 0.752 -0.027 0.747 -0.025 0.771 
FAMILY  OWNED  0.022 0.804 -0.006 0.944 0.023 0.803 0.037 0.682 
CONSTR  0.018 0.882 0.088 0.476 0.051 0.684 0.045 0.715 
SERVICES  -0.205  0.046  -0.235  0.022  -0.196  0.056  -0.187  0.070 
RETAIL  0.116 0.290 0.150 0.171 0.142 0.194 0.165 0.134 
EMPLOYEE  GROWTH  0.093 0.663 0.039 0.855 0.081 0.703 0.091 0.672 
SALES  GROWTH  -0.037 0.484 -0.033 0.530 -0.040 0.453 -0.029 0.587 
PPE-to-ASSETS  -0.055 0.751 -0.005 0.976 -0.036 0.834 0.005 0.978 
R&D EMPLOYEES  0.533  0.082  0.593  0.049  0.523  0.086  0.607  0.047 
Loan contract variables                 
SECURE AR/INV  0.177  0.045  0.165  0.061  0.162  0.066      
SECURE OTHER  0.232  0.020  0.235  0.017  0.237  0.017      
GUARANTEED  0.143  0.062  0.136  0.074  0.134  0.079      
COMP BALANCES  -0.220  0.069  -0.216  0.065  -0.204  0.092      
                   
Adj  R-sq  0.2455 0.2461 0.2552 0.2401 
Observations  520 520 520 520 
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Table 6.  Regression of interest rate spread (PREMIUM) by size structure and bank size. 
OLS regressions for the interest rate spread.  The dependent variable in all the regressions in this table is PREMIUM, 
the spread over the prime rate of the bank loan.  The regressions have different combinations of independent variables 
using different splits of the main data sets.  The shaded areas indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Dependent variable:    PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM 
  
Small-bank markets 
(deposits at banks with 
less than $1 billion in 
assets is greater than 
24.91%) 
Large-bank markets 
(deposits at banks with 
less than $1 billion in 
assets is less than 
24.91%) 
Small Banks (assets 
less than $1 billion) 
Large Banks (assets 
over $1 billion) 
   Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T| 
Variable Estimate              Estimate              Estimate              Estimate             
                 
INTERCEPT  4.172  0.000  1.821  0.335  3.613  0.002  4.005  0.000 
Size structure             
SIZE 2 SHARE  -0.717  0.054 0.619 0.737  -0.423  0.292  -0.971  0.067 
SIZE 3 SHARE  -0.744  0.078 1.078 0.541  -0.711  0.101  -1.084  0.028 
SIZE 4 SHARE  -0.983  0.045 0.872 0.616  -0.676  0.197  -0.863  0.104 
Bank variables             
SIZE  2  BANK  -0.221 0.277 -0.054 0.821 0.032 0.853     
SIZE 3 BANK  -0.351  0.186  -0.043  0.869         
SIZE  4  BANK  0.040 0.903 0.005 0.987      0.058  0.618 
Bank-firm relationship variable               
RELATE  LENGTH  -0.024 0.809 -0.087 0.228 -0.108 0.279  -0.136  0.056 
Other banking market variables               
HERFINDAHL  1.391 0.065 0.889 0.322 1.101 0.154  0.796  0.253 
DE  NOVO  ENTRY  0.114 0.546 0.034 0.788  -0.109  0.540  0.017  0.897 
MKT MERGERS  1.577  0.099 -0.049 0.936 0.382 0.692 0.476 0.418 
MKT  ACQUISITIONS  -0.156 0.896 -0.358 0.699 0.034 0.976  -0.521  0.573 
MKT  BANK  GROWTH  0.681 0.310 0.431 0.285 0.681 0.293  0.541  0.198 
STATE INC GROWTH  0.222  0.975  -3.809  0.544  7.833  0.271  -1.526  0.785 
MSA  DUMMY  0.050 0.802 0.019 0.941  -0.082  0.725  0.212  0.275 
MKT BANK ROE  1.505  0.432  -0.042  0.972  0.878  0.615  0.971  0.371 
MKT  BK  NONPERF  8.059 0.260 7.215 0.103  16.405  0.007  2.610  0.576 
MKT BK EQ-to-ASSET  -4.483  0.553  0.649  0.946  -14.510  0.070  -0.291  0.970 
MKT PCT BANK FAIL  1.609  0.085 -0.841 0.346 0.122 0.917 1.453 0.054 
Other bank variables                 
BK  MERGERS  -0.157 0.380 0.015 0.894  -0.338  0.119  0.130  0.244 
BK ACQUISITIONS  -0.409  0.088 -0.075 0.690 -0.445 0.096  -0.121  0.496 
MULTI  BHC  0.121 0.449 -0.129 0.331 0.174 0.307  -0.045  0.766 
OUT OF STATE BHC  0.295  0.082 -0.145 0.243 0.068 0.753 0.165 0.142 
BK  ROE  -0.473 0.565 -0.682 0.084 -0.533 0.237  -0.547  0.490 
BK EQUITY RATIO  -1.112  0.806  8.333  0.047  6.688  0.089  -1.495  0.774 
BK NONPERF LOANS  -2.312  0.500  -2.317  0.310  -2.498  0.400  -2.195  0.418 
Firm  variables             
FIRM  AGE  0.028 0.840 -0.146 0.136 0.114 0.411  -0.096  0.340 
LEVERAGE 0.046  0.808  -0.068  0.600  -0.008  0.967  0.125  0.372 
PROFIT  MARGIN  -0.121 0.716 0.147 0.586  -0.142  0.670  0.213  0.440 
CURRENT  RATIO  0.047 0.281 0.044 0.161 0.096 0.024  -0.035  0.272 
QUICK RATIO  0.026  0.006 -0.007 0.210 0.018 0.066 0.000 0.951   37
Table 6 continued. 
 
Dependent variable:    PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM  PREMIUM 
 
Small-bank markets 
(deposits at banks with 
less than $1 billion in 
assets is greater than 
24.91%) 
Large-bank markets 
(deposits at banks with 
less than $1 billion in 
assets is less than 
24.91%) 
 
Small Banks (assets 
less than $1 billion) 
Large Banks (assets 
over $1 billion) 
   Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter  Prob > |T|  Parameter Prob > |T|  Parameter Prob > |T|
Variable Estimate              Estimate              Estimate              Estimate             
AR TURNOVER  0.003  0.288  -0.002  0.235  -0.002  0.506  0.002  0.195 
INV TURNOVER  0.001  0.519  -0.002  0.052 -0.001  0.465  -0.001  0.548 
AP  TURNOVER  -0.001 0.499 0.003 0.017  0.003  0.157  0.000  0.796 
Ln(ASSETS)  -0.053 0.580 -0.024 0.717  -0.063  0.497  -0.025  0.711 
Ln(SALES)  -0.167  0.100 -0.108 0.106  -0.155  0.106  -0.127  0.078 
PERS  DELINQ  0.017 0.953 0.096 0.693  0.212  0.508  -0.008  0.974 
BUS DELINQ  0.334  0.080  0.395  0.001  0.395  0.027  0.313  0.019 
JUDGMENT  -0.227 0.438 -0.027 0.925  -0.442  0.159  0.200  0.472 
CORPORATION  0.269 0.287 0.008 0.975  0.276  0.241  0.194  0.479 
SUBCHAPTER S  0.360  0.177  -0.103  0.679  0.224  0.356  0.215  0.443 
PARTNERSHIP 0.248  0.518  -0.072  0.809  -0.111  0.744  0.083  0.805 
OWNER  MANAGED  -0.176 0.229 0.172 0.102  0.087  0.595  -0.001  0.993 
FAMILY OWNED  0.126  0.440  -0.090  0.401  0.084  0.604  -0.069  0.553 
CONSTR  -0.126 0.542 0.153 0.338  -0.032  0.877  0.114  0.492 
SERVICES  -0.309  0.100 -0.094 0.448  -0.088  0.645  -0.340  0.009 
RETAIL  0.167 0.363 0.133 0.362  0.159  0.362  -0.017  0.916 
EMPLOYEE GROWTH  0.203  0.536  -0.084  0.778  0.598  0.191  -0.067  0.786 
SALES  GROWTH  -0.037 0.675 -0.064 0.350  0.008  0.926  -0.068  0.341 
PPE-to-ASSETS 0.068  0.813  -0.038  0.870  0.057  0.838  0.099  0.667 
R&D EMPLOYEES  0.089  0.892  0.793  0.021 0.428  0.351  0.897  0.053 
Loan contract variables                 
SECURE AR/INV  0.273  0.059 0.167 0.155  0.258  0.096  0.148  0.201 
SECURE OTHER  0.390  0.015 0.091 0.497  0.491  0.003 -0.009 0.944 
GUARANTEED 0.081  0.542  0.174  0.072 0.099  0.467  0.121  0.228 
COMP BALANCES  -0.153  0.472  -0.247  0.096 -0.086  0.695  -0.277  0.061 
                   
Adj R-sq  0.2239  0.3024   0.2664  0.184 
Observations  260 260  224  296 
 
 
 
 
 